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Abstract
We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stake-
holder, that enjoys benefits upon a bilateral agreement. To address the strategic
implications of stakeholders over negotiations, we consider a model where two bar-
gainers interact in the presence of a third party that (a) can transfer a share of
her benefits to the bargainers but cannot receive a share of the bilateral surplus,
and (b) while she may not participate in all periods of the negotiation, she cannot
remain entirely inhibited. Our main findings are (1) that the stakeholder’s (reverse)
liquidity constraint implies the existence of a multiplicity of stationary subgame
perfect equilibria that include outcomes with very asymmetric bilateral agreements,
and (2) that the partial participation of the stakeholder may be the source of severe
ineﬃciency.
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1 Introduction
Bargaining between two parties often aﬀects stakeholders, third parties who care for the
resolution of the conflict, and yet are unable to impose an agreement upon the contending
bargainers. We model such bargaining problems as non-cooperative games with three
players: two bargainers, who must reach an agreement on how to split one unit of bilateral
surplus, and a third player, the stakeholder, who enjoys a positive externality upon the
bilateral agreement. Two specific features distinguish stakeholder bargaining games from
regular trilateral negotiations. The first is the (reverse) liquidity constraint that aﬀects the
stakeholder who can transfer a share of her benefits to the bargainers but cannot receive
a share of the bilateral surplus. The second is that while the stakeholder cannot commit
to remain inhibited, her participation is not assured in every period of the negotiation
either.1
The stakeholder can only be at best a facilitator who is not allowed however to ex-
tract any of the surplus from the bargaining parties. Scenarios of this type abound in
industrial relations. In sectors of public interest the disruption of essential services like
public transport, air traﬃc control, hospitals or the supply of utilities has a substantial
impact on the population at large. Correspondingly, the government’s stake in bilateral
conflicts which are of public concern is of great consequence. In these situations, while the
government might be willing to provide a handout to foster agreement, claiming a share
of the bilateral surplus under negotiation is not an option. Our model also applies to
international relations. For example, in an armed conflict that threatens the political sta-
bility of a region extending beyond the geographically disputed borders, the international
community is a stakeholder. Third party intervention often takes the form of positive
transfers (aid) to facilitate agreements; transfers from the contender to the international
organizations are out of the question.
The eﬀects of the liquidity constraint are addressed in the first part of the paper. We
show that in a tripartite bargaining game - where the stakeholder is active throughout the
negotiations - when the stake is small, this constraint causes a multiplicity of stationary
subgame perfect equilibria. This multiplicity of equilibria supports outcomes in which
the stakeholder does not transfer any portion of her stake and yet the bargainers share
the bilateral surplus very diﬀerently from the usual Rubinstein-Stahl split. This occurs
because the lack of transferability creates a slack in the equilibrium conditions that relate
1Since the only action available to the stakeholder is to transfer her stake, our model does not apply to
those settings whereby the interested third party has the ability to inflict damage onto the two contenders;
nor to situations where the two original negotiators might be prepared to transfer resources to the
stakeholder in order to keep him out of negotiations; in other words, we do not allow for the possibility
of bribes.
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the current oﬀer to the expected payoﬀ of rejecting and this slack can be taken up in
various ways. This result requires that the stakeholder has some bargaining power in the
sense that she can put forward proposals.
In the second part of the paper we focus on the eﬀects of partial participation/abstention
by the stakeholder, and we show that the sheer possibility that the stakeholder may in-
tervene in negotiations creates the potential for delays. The reason is simple: if the
institutional arrangements are such that the stakeholder is not a full participant in all
periods, the bargainers may have an incentive to delay bilateral agreement in the hope
to pressurize her into conceding extra resources. Hence, the potential participation of a
stakeholder may have detrimental eﬀects, introducing ineﬃciencies - in stationary strate-
gies and under complete information - where there would not be any in its absence. The
expectation of an increased surplus to share causes delays that, from the point of view of
the bargainers, are eﬃcient. This is a particular instance of the more general phenomenon
discussed in [11]. In the present context, however, when all aﬀected parties are taken into
account, delays are ineﬃcient.
One could object that since with perfect information bilateral negotiations always
ensure an eﬃcient outcome2, there is no reason why a third party, the stakeholder, should
get involved. Yet, as it is often the case in services of public interest, the situation at
hand may be one such that the stakeholder cannot get away from. It is thus important
to emphasize that in the present analysis the stakeholder’s does not choose to become
involved; because she is unable to commit to inhibition, she sometimes finds herself drawn
into the bargaining table. This immediately presents a potential for exploitation by the
two bargainers: as long as the stakeholder suﬀers from disagreement, bargainers should
succeed in extracting resources from the stakeholder, and this opens the door to ineﬃcient
delays.
In addition to the connection with [11] discussed above, our paper relates to the
literature on bargaining with arbitration or mediation, and to the literature on coalition
formation. The assumption that stakeholders enjoy a positive externality distinguishes
our model from models of bargaining with arbitration or mediation, in which a third party
(the mediator) derives no utility from an agreement (e.g. [3], [7] and [9]). Externalities are
a main concern in the recent literature on coalition formation (see [1], [4], [6], [8], [12], [17]).
The main focus of this literature is to characterize non-cooperative equilibrium outcomes
for bargaining problems in partition function. Stakeholder bargaining situations can be
viewed as pertaining to the class of three player bargaining games in partition function
2This is the case in the Rubinstein bargaining model. However it is well known that ineﬃcient
equilibria can obtain in alternating oﬀers bargaining models even with complete information, once the
original extensive form ([16]) is modified. See chapter 7 in [13].
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analyzed in depth in [2] and [5]3. However, the crucial features of stakeholder bargaining
are the liquidity and participation constraint of one of the players, and these have not
been addressed in the preceding literature.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
characterizes equilibria in games where the stakeholder is present every period and points
out at the diﬀerence with standard three player bargaining. The emergence of delays in
equilibrium is addressed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stakeholder bargaining games
The general setup for a Stakeholder Bargaining (SB) game is as follows. Two bargainers
(indexed 1 and 2) have to agree between them over the division of some surplus, normalized
to unity, which is available only in case of agreement. This agreement has an eﬀect over
player 3, the stakeholder, who obtains a positive payoﬀ of s if the negotiators settle their
dispute, and 0 otherwise. Thus the bargainers consensus on how to split their bilateral
surplus of 1 is necessary and suﬃcient to generate the total surplus 1 + s, where the
stake s is an externality that the bilateral agreement generates over 3. The set of feasible
agreements is a subset of what it would be if all parties involved had the same rights
on 1 + s (which is the case in standard three player bargaining). Figure 1 depicts the
bargaining set in the stakeholder bargaining game and clarifies this point. While the set
of agreements in a standard three player bargaining problem consists of all points in three
dimensional simplex of size 1+s , the feasible set of agreements in the present environment
corresponds only to the shaded trapeze.
Bargaining proceeds over a (potentially infinite) number of rounds, t = 0,∆, 2∆... At
each period, the state of the game determines whether player 3 is active or not, specifies
the set of admissible proposals and appoints the proposer. The initial state of the game is
given (possibly at random). In rounds where 3 is not active the game is in a bipartite state,
denoted st = sBi , tripartite states are denoted s
T
i and the subindex indicates the proposer.
Proposals at bipartite states consist of a division of the bilateral surplus x = (x1, x2) with
x1, x2 ≥ 0 and x1 + x2 = 1, and an agreement at such states yields a division of the
total surplus (x1, x2, s). At tripartite states, bargainers may receive resources from 3 in
addition to their share of the bilateral surplus, but 3 cannot extract resources from the
contending bargainers beyond the value of the stake s, thus a proposal is a division of
the total surplus y = (y1, y2, y3) y1, y2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ y3 ≤ s and y1 + y2 + y3 = 1 + s.
3Their messages are mixed: The model of [2] yields non-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibria
that may be ineﬃcient and where externalities are irrelevant for equilibrium payoﬀs. In contrast, [5]
obtains a unique equilibrium were the agents payoﬀs are monotone and (piece-wise) linerarly dependent
on the externalities they impose on others.
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(y1,y2,y3)
(0,0,1+s)
(1+s, 0, 0) (0, 1+s, 0)
(0, 1,s)(1,0,s)
Figure 1: Set of feasible agreements in the stakeholder bargaining game; (y1, y2, y3) is one
such point.
Each period, the proposer chooses a proposal and the responder(s) accept or reject; in
tripartite states replies follow the natural order.4 When a proposal is accepted (by all
active responders), the game ends and the agreement is implemented. Upon rejection,
play moves to the next time period and the state at t + 1 is determined as follows: if
st = s
B
i then with probability p the state becomes st+1 = s
B
j , j 9= i, and with probability
1−p the state becomes st+1 = sT3 ; if st = sTi then st+1 = sTi+1 with probability 1.5 Agents
have a common discount factor δ = e−r∆, where r is the discount rate. Consequently
an agreement reached at time t allocating the total surplus according to some division
z = (z1, z2, z3) yields utility ui (z, t) = δ
tzi to player i.
This general description includes as extreme cases pure bilateral bargaining without
3’s intervention (s0 = sB1 and p = 1); and tripartite stakeholder bargaining (TSB) where
bipartite rounds are ruled out (s0 = s
T
i ). The extensive form of the SB game with s0 = s
B
i
and the TSB game is sketched in Figure 2.
Strategies and Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) are defined in the standard way.
Stationary strategy profiles are fully characterized by a vector specifying proposals and
acceptance thresholds (whichever applicable) for each player at each state of the game
4We follow the convention that 1 follows 3. More generality on the timing of replies is inconsequential.
Also, we are formally assuming that at tripartite states the stakeholder has veto power over bilateral
agreements, even if x3 = s. This is only for expositional simplicity and has no consequence, since
exercising this veto power is a dominated action.
5The analysis extends easily to other specifications of state transitions, including time and state
dependent transition probabilities.
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where she is active. A Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE) is a profile of
strategies that constitutes an SPE. A SSPE is an Immediate Agreement Equilibrium (IAE)
if it yields agreement at t = 0; and a Delayed Agreement Equilibrium (DAE) is an SSPE
where disagreement occurs at least in one state of the game.
We start by pointing out at the fundamental diﬀerence between an SB game and a
trilateral negotiation over 1 + s.
3 The stakeholder’s liquidity constraint
Assume that the initial state of the game is tripartite and negotiations begin with the
stakeholder proposing at time t = 0, s0 = sT3 .
Because she cannot access any of the bilateral bargaining surplus, the stakeholder’s
payoﬀ can be at most s (if an agreement prevails and she makes no contributions to bar-
gainers) - this produces quite dramatic eﬀects. If s is not too great, the unique stationary
equilibrium of the corresponding ‘equal-rights’ trilateral bargaining problem is no longer
achievable; furthermore, the presence of a stakeholder introduces multiplicity of equilibria
even in stationary strategies.
As it is well known (see e.g. [14]), the standard trilateral alternating bargaining game
over 1+s yields a unique stationary equilibrium partition, i.e. y∗ =
?
1+s
1+δ+δ2 ,
δ(1+s)
1+δ+δ2 ,
δ2(1+s)
1+δ+δ2
?
,
which in the limit as the discount factor approaches unity converges to y∗ =
?
1+s
3
, 1+s
3
, 1+s
3
?
,
where the first, second and third entry refer to the first, second and third mover payoﬀs,
respectively. Because in the TSB game the stakeholder’s share is bounded above by s,
when s is not ‘too large’ there is a continuum of partitions of the bilateral surplus that
can be supported in a stationary equilibrium and moreover the splits of the bilateral
surplus that are reached along such equilibria can be very diﬀerent from the usual bilat-
eral monopoly one. In the present set up if s is relatively small, when the stakeholder
proposes the equilibrium payoﬀ of the (responding) bargainers exceeds the equilibrium
continuation payoﬀ, and because of this slack, bargainers cannot take anything away from
the stakeholder (whose equilibrium payoﬀ is at any rate less than what she would get in
trilateral bargaining over 1 + s ). Then we can state the following:
Proposition 1 Assume the initial state is s0 = s
T
3 with probability 1. In the limit as
∆→ 0:
i) When s is suﬃciently small (i.e. s < 1
2
), any proposal (x, 1− x, s) where the
stakeholder makes no contribution, with x ∈
?
1
3
(1 + s) , 2−s
3
?
can be supported in a SSPE,
and there are no other SSPE.
ii) Otherwise, when s ≥ 1
2
, the unique SSPE outcome coincides with that of a trilateral
bargaining game over 1 + s.
7
iii) There can be no DAE.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To gain the intuition for this result, fix a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and consider a
node oﬀ the equilibrium path where, following a series of rejections, the stakeholder puts
forward the equilibrium proposal (x, 1− x, s). Backtracking to the previous period, an
oﬀer by bargainer 2 would be accepted only if it yielded each respondent a payoﬀ at least
equal to the present discounted value of his continuation payoﬀ following a rejection. This
means that bargainer 2 would have to concede δs and δx to players 3 and 1, respectively,
and retain for himself the residual payoﬀ 1 + (1− δ) s − δx. Similarly, backtracking one
more period, the proposal by bargainer 1 would be accepted only as long as it yielded δ2s
and δ (1 + (1− δ) s− δx) to players 3 and 2, respectively, leaving player 1 with the residual
payoﬀ 1 + s− δ (1 + (1− δ) s− δx)− δ2s = (1 + s) (1− δ) + δ2x. The latter implies that
any proposal (x, 1− x, s) by the stakeholder should yield at least δ (1 + s) (1− δ) + δ2x
to player 1 and δ (1 + (1− δ) s− δx) to player 2, that is x ≥ δ (1 + s) (1− δ) + δ2x and
1−x ≥ δ (1 + (1− δ) s− δx). Provided s is not too large, there is a whole range of possible
proposals (x, 1− x, s) which are acceptable to both bargainers, and in all of them at least
one bargainer obtains an equilibrium payoﬀ in excess of his continuation payoﬀ! This
would never be possible in a stationary equilibrium of a standard trilateral bargaining
game: in that case it cannot be optimal for a proposer to settle for an agreement that
rewards opponents more than their continuation payoﬀ, as she could improve on her own
payoﬀ by claiming a bit more, until she makes her opponents indiﬀerent between accepting
and rejecting. This is not always possible in the SB game, though, as the stakeholder
can at most retain all of her stake s in equilibrium. Because of this reverse liquidity
constraint, if the stake is ‘small’, this upper bound on the stakeholder’s payoﬀ has a bite,
and it is this which causes a multiplicity of stationary equilibria to arise. Note that this
result does not depend on δ, and in the limit as the period between successive oﬀers, ∆,
becomes negligibly small (so that δ → 1) the range of values of x which can be supported
in an SSPE lies in the closed interval
?
1
3
(1 + s) , 2−s
3
?
.
The ‘disturbance’ introduced by the presence of the stakeholder makes itself felt even
when the stake is negligibly small: as s → 0, and δ → 1 the admissible range for x
approaches
?
1
3
, 2
3
?
, whereas the division (1
2
, 1
2
) would prevail uniquely in the absence of
the stakeholder. The reason for this is that while in a standard bilateral bargaining
game negotiators’ oﬀers would make the respondent just indiﬀerent between accepting
and making a counterproposal, this threat to ‘punish’ a greedy proposer by rejecting an
oﬀer an getting the upper hand in the next round as a proposer is watered down by the
presence of the stakeholder, who could come in and insist on any division of the bargaining
surplus.
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The multiplicity of equilibria is a fundamental feature that does not depend on our
specific formulation of the protocol. It is not diﬃcult to check that a proposition in the
same vein as proposition 1 holds for a modification with random proposers.
The set of equilibria of proposition 1 is depicted in Figure 3 as the thick black line,
where one possible equilibrium agreement (x, 1− x, s) is highlighted. The delimiting
sloping border on the left side is the set of feasible agreements all yielding a payoﬀ of
1
3
(1 + s) for player 1. Similarly, the delimiting sloping border on the right hand side
corresponds to those feasible agreements yielding a payoﬀ 2−s
3
to player 2.
(0,0,1+s)
(1+s, 0, 0) (0, 1+s, 0)
(0, 1,s)(1,0,s)
3
1
1
s
x
+
=
3
2
2
s
x
−
=
(x, 1-x,s)
Figure 3: The equilibrium agreements of proposition 1.
The proof of point iii) in proposition 1 implies that as long as all three agents are
active, agreement is not delayed:
Corollary 2 There can be no DAE due to disagreement in a tripartite negotiation round.
Details are in the Appendix, but the intuition is straightforward. Since we are dealing
with stationary strategies, the only way to obtain delayed agreement is that for some
tripartite state, in equilibrium all proposal are rejected. The consequence is that the
proposer in that state loses all the bargaining power deriving from her role as the proposer.
On the other hand, all of the agents ‘pay’ the cost of a rejection by moving negotiations
to the next round. This is however what destroys the possibility of delay in equilibrium,
as the agent whose oﬀer is always rejected can ‘bank’ on these rejection costs and make
an oﬀer which makes her better oﬀ and that responders have an incentive to accept.
To see this, take for instance a candidate equilibrium where the stakeholder’s proposal
9
is always rejected. In this case the bargainers can coordinate and extract the entire
stakeholder’s surplus, by insisting on a complete handout each time they make a proposal.
The stakeholder would have no incentive to refuse such a proposal, as a rejection would
trigger either a subgame where the stakeholder is a proposer, in which case no agreement
follows; or one in which one of the bargainers makes the same oﬀer the stakeholder has
just rejected. However, precisely for this reason, this cannot be an equilibrium, for the
stakeholder has an incentive to make an oﬀer that would be accepted: for instance, she
could oﬀer immediately the same surplus division as a bargainer would do in the next
round, and give out all of her stake but a small amount. Similar arguments apply to
the candidate equilibrium where a bargainer’s proposal is always rejected. It is then
immediate that TSB games, since all agents are active at all rounds, cannot have DAE.
A remark on delay and non-stationary equilibria: In multilateral bargaining games
of alternating proposals, stationary equilibria do not exhaust the set of SPE, other
non-stationary equilibria may exist (See eg. section 3.13 in [14]). This is the case in
the present model, too. Non-stationarity allows us to construct equilibria with de-
layed agreement. At any rate, in general the punishments needed to support delayed
equilibria of this type are rather extreme, while seldom observed in practice.6
4 Limited participation and delays
We now turn our attention to games where the stakeholder’s participation is not always
assured and we show that this translates in the possibility that in a stationary equilibria
agreements are delayed. As discussed above, if a DAE exist, it must be that the stake-
holder is not always active, and some rounds of play take place in a bipartite state where
bargainers disagree. Thus the question is whether the stakeholder’s limited participa-
tion is in itself suﬃcient for a DAE to exist, and if and under what conditions eﬃcient
equilibria obtain.
As we show below, in a SB game that combines bipartite states and some tripartite
states (where the stakeholder acts as responder), when the stake is suﬃciently sizeable,
the unique SSPE is a DAE. The intuition for this result is that whenever the stakeholder is
involved in negotiations as a responder, the possibility arises for the bargainers to extract
a sizable part of her stake. Thus, because bargainers can extract additional surplus from
the stakeholder, if the stake is suﬃciently large they have the incentive to ‘sit it out’, that
is to disagree in bipartite states and wait for the stakeholder to become active. On the
other hand, when the stake is suﬃciently small, the unique equilibrium is an IAE:
6Complexity arguments can be used to justify stationary strategies in bargaining games. See for
instance [18].
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Proposition 3 For each SB game with s0 = sBi and 0 < p < 1, in the limit as ∆→ 0:
i) if s ≥ 1
2
the unique equilibrium is a DAE in which disagreement prevails at all
st = s
B
i and immediate agreement prevails at st = s
T
i ;
ii) if s < 1
2
the unique equilibrium is an IAE.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To see why Proposition 3 holds, recall that Corollary 2 establishes that there can be
no disagreement in tripartite states. Consequently, the only way for a DAE to occur is
because of disagreement in bipartite states. This can be supported in equilibrium only if
the expected discounted continuation joint payoﬀ exceeds the joint payoﬀ from a bilateral
agreement. A necessary condition for this to happen is that some contribution from the
stakeholder is forthcoming, which is possible as we saw above only when the stake is
suﬃciently large. In short, games where at any round the involvement of the stakeholder
is not assured generate disagreement whenever the stake is suﬃciently attractive.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced stakeholder bargaining games as a novel frame of ref-
erence for bilateral negotiations when the interests of third parties - stakeholders - can
be aﬀected, so that - and this is the crucial feature - the stakeholder may have an inter-
est to inject additional resources in the dispute in order to encourage agreement. Our
analysis makes two main points: i) When the stakes are small and the participation of
the stakeholder is assured a continuum of equilibria exist and very asymmetric bilateral
agreements may prevail. ii) When the participation of the stakeholder is uncertain and
the stake is high ineﬃciencies abound, in the sense that delayed agreements obtain in
equilibrium with positive probability.
Besides being suited to analyze negotiations which are originally configured as stake-
holder bargaining games, our model lends itself to a number of possible extension. For
instance it could be used to investigate the incentives that exists in bilateral bargain-
ing to relinquish irrevocably one’s bargaining rights and thereby opt for a decentralized
bargaining protocol. For concreteness, a public authority with the ability to relocate
property rights may want to separate into two (a stakeholder and a bargainer) when ne-
gotiating with another party. Our analysis suggests that in the context of public sector
negotiations, this implies that reducing the size of government (i.e. the stake) can be ad-
vantageous from the perspective of the public sector, in the sense that governments may
have an incentive to decentralize - and become stakeholders rather than directly involved
negotiating partners - as they may gain as stakeholders an advantage which would be
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lost in direct negotiations (i.e. retaining their stake). An issue which is closely related
is the extent to which a stakeholder might be able to choose whether or not to intervene
in negotiations.7 Finally, a more realistic approach would be to consider the eﬀects of
uncertainty on the part of the bargainers over the exact amount of resources available to
the stakeholder. We leave these issues to be addressed properly in future research.
6 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
i) As a preliminary, let xi = (xi1, x
i
2, x
i
3) denote the surplus division of 1 + s proposed
by agent i, where xi1 + x
i
2 + x
i
2 = 1 + s and x
i
3 ≤ s. Assume that x3 = (x, 1− x, s). With
x ∈
?
δ(1+s)
1+δ+δ2 ,
1+δ−δ2s
1+δ+δ2
?
and δ ∈ (0, 1), equilibrium strategies are for bargainer 1 to propose
x1 with x11 = δ
2x+ (1− δ) (1 + s) and x13 = (1− δ2)s; for bargainer 2 to propose x2 with
x22 = 1− δx+(1− δ) s and x23 = (1− δ)s; and for the stakeholder to propose (x, 1− x, s).
Regarding responses, each agent accepts an oﬀer yielding at least the present discounted
value of the equilibrium continuation payoﬀ and rejects otherwise. Equilibrium proposals
are derived based on the following considerations.
For a proposal to be accepted by the stakeholder in a subgame where bargainer i
proposes it must be that
x23 = δs
x13 = δ
2s
Bargainer i’s proposed share xii for herself must satisfy
1 +
?
1− δ2
?
s− x11 = δx22
1 + (1− δ) s− x22 = δx
Given their strategies, the stakeholders’ proposal (x, 1− x, s) is acceptable to the bar-
gainers only insofar as
x ≥ δx11 = δ
?
δ2x+ (1− δ) (1 + s)
?
⇒ x ≥ δ(1+s)
1+δ+δ2 ≡ x
1− x ≥ δx12 = δ
?
1 + s− x11 − δ2s
?
= δ2 (1− δx+ (1− δ) s) = δ2x22 ⇒ x ≤ 1+δ−δ
2s
1+δ+δ2 ≡ x
whereby
x > x⇔ s < 1
δ (1 + δ)
= s.
From the equilibrium conditions above it is clear that only proposals (x, 1− x, s) with
x ∈
?
δ(1+s)
1+δ+δ2 ,
1+δ−δ2s
1+δ+δ2
?
can be supported in an SSPE. Moreover, at least one bargainer
7In [15] and [10], we explore games where the stakeholder’s decision to participate is strategic, mod-
elling the environment as a concession game.
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obtains a payoﬀ in excess of his continuation payoﬀ. If there were another SSPE, then
it would have to be the case that the stakeholder makes a contribution γi ≥ 0 to each
bargainer, 0 < γ = γ1 + γ2 ≤ s, so that the outcome is (x+ γ1, 1− x+ γ2+, s− γ), and
at least one bargainer obtains a payoﬀ in excess of his continuation payoﬀ. It is clear that
both players getting a payoﬀ in excess of their continuation value cannot be an equilibrium,
since the stakeholder could decrease her contribution a bit and still get acceptance. Say
that only player 2 gets a payoﬀ in excess of his continuation value, then the stakeholder
could improve on this oﬀer by a proposal (x+ γ1, 1− x+ γ2+, s − γ) choosing γ1 = γ1+ε
and γ2 = γ2 − 2ε: provided that ε is suﬃciently small, both bargainers will still want to
accept, and the stakeholder will retain a higher portion of her payoﬀ. Taking the limit as
∆→ 0 (so that δ → 1) yields the statement.
ii) The proof is standard thus omitted for the sake of brevity, see e.g. [14].
iii) Consider state sTi and let Vj j = 1, 2, 3 denote players’ ex-ante expected payoﬀs
in the continuation after disagreement prevails in this state. In any DAE it must be that
V1 + V2 + V3 ≤ 1 + s, so that 1 + s > δ (1 + s) ≥ δ (V1 + V2 + V3). The two extremes
of this last set of inequalities guarantee that the proposer, i, is better oﬀ by having her
proposal accepted, as a deviation to an acceptable proposal (yielding responders j, k 9= i
a total share δ (Vj + Vk)) guarantees a higher payoﬀ than any proposal that j and k
reject (since 1 + s− δ (Vj + Vk) > δVi ). Note that when the proposer is the stakeholder,
either s = max {s, 1 + s− δ (V1, V2)}, in which case the previous argument applies; or
s 9= max {s, 1 + s− δ (V1, V2)}, in which case by deviating to an acceptable oﬀer the
stakeholder would achieve a payoﬀ of s, which exceeds any discounted continuation payoﬀ.
Proof of proposition 3
Recall from the proof of proposition 1 that s ≡ 1δ(1+δ) . From corollary 2, a DAE requires
that (equilibrium) proposals in bipartite states are rejected. Denote by WBi = V
B
i1 + V
B
i2
the joint expected payoﬀs of bargainers upon disagreement at state sBi , and by W
T =
V T1 + V
T
2 the joint expected payoﬀ in tripartite states s
T
3 . Obviously W
B
i must solve
WBi = pδW
B
j + δ(1−p)W T . The continuation payoﬀ to the bargainers in tripartite states
sT3 depends on how large the stake s is. Thus there can be two cases:
(A) Suppose s ≥ s, so that the outcome in state sT3 is immediate agreement at the
standard trilateral partition
?
δ(1+s)
1+δ+δ2 ,
δ2(1+s)
1+δ+δ2 ,
1+s
1+δ+δ2
?
. In this case WBi solves W
B
i =
pδWBj + δ(1 − p)
(δ+δ2)(1+s)
1+δ+δ2 , so that W
B
i = W
B
j = δ
2 (1+s)(1+δ)(1−p)
(1+δ+δ2)(1−pδ)
≡ WB . Then, in
bipartite states disagreement must prevail when δWB > 1, and this inequality holds pro-
vided that δ3 (1+s)(1+δ)(1−p)
(1+δ+δ2)(1−pδ)
> 1, or equivalently for s > sˆ (case (i) in proposition 3). If
instead s ≤ sˆ, then δWB ≤ 1, so that the unique stationary equilibrium is with immediate
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agreement at all st = sBi (case (ii) in proposition 3). Note that sˆ ≥ s.8
(B) Suppose s < s , so that the outcome in state sT3 is an immediate agreement on
a partition in which the stakeholder makes no contribution. Then the bargainers joint
payoﬀ in state sT3 is 1, and there are no incentives for delay, thus agreement in the bipartite
state is immediate. Supporting strategies are the obvious ones, thus omitted for the sake
of brevity (i.e. in DAE bargainers make unacceptable oﬀers and in tripartite states follow
the strategies which support the equilibria of proposition 1, while in IAE proposers make
the just acceptable oﬀers, that is the expected present discounted value of the equilibrium
continuation payoﬀ in case of disagreement). Taking the limit as ∆→ 0 (so that δ → 1)
yields the statement of the proposition.
8In fact
sˆ− s =
δ (1− δ) (1 + δ)2 + 1− pδ
?
1 + δ − δ3
?
δ3 (1 + δ) (1− p)
− 1
δ (1 + δ)
= (1− δ)
?
1 + δ + δ2
? 1 + δ (1− p)
δ3 (1 + δ) (1− p)
> 0
14
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